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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund sharehold-
ers particularly reduces ex ante bad acquisitions. When ﬁrms with large public
pension fund presence do acquire other ﬁrms, they perform relatively better in
the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite eﬀect or no
eﬀect. Identifying the sources of exogenous variation in institutional ownership is
crucial to establish the direction of causality between institutional ownership and
observed corporate merger and acquisition decisions. This paper introduces two
new approaches. First, I decompose the institutional ownership into one compo-
nent which is correlated with future M&A shocks, and the noise component which
is not. I instrument for the various ownerships using this noise term. Second, I
instrument for institutional ownership using exogenous shocks to their portfolio
sizes interacted with their propensities to invest in each corporation.
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Institutional investors hold more than half of all U.S. publicly traded equity.1 The fastest growing
institutional investors — public pension funds and mutual funds — saw their assets growing at
compound annual growth rates of 14% and 20%, respectively, in the 1990s.2 Many theories3 have
suggested that shareholders with large investment stakes — often institutional investors — are the
most likely monitors of publicly traded companies. However, there has been very little evidence
empirically documenting the eﬀectiveness of institutional investor monitoring.
The main hurdle in establishing institutional investor inﬂuence lies in the diﬃculty of identifying
the exogenous variation in their shareholdings. Given the belief4 that they are often smarter and
better informed than individual investors, institutional ownership, ﬁrm performance, and ﬁrm
decisions are often jointly determined. It is quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd an appropriate instrument to
establish the direction of causation. Variables such as dividend yield, liquidity, return volatility,
transaction costs, and major index inclusion etc., either are weak instruments, or are correlated
with the shocks to ﬁrm decisions.
To surmount this diﬃculty, I introduce two new IV approaches to study institutional investor
inﬂuence in corporate M&A activity. These strategies rely on very diﬀerent sources of variation
and identiﬁcation assumptions, but they reach similar conclusions of the study. First, I identify
an institutional investor’s preference for ﬁrm acquisitiveness using its portfolio composition, and
decompose its ownership into one component that is related to this preference, and the noise
component that is orthorgonal to it. The assumption I make is that institutional preference is stable
over a horizon of one year. Given this assumption, if institutions are able to forecast future shocks
155.8% in 2001, Institutional Investment Report, The Conference Board, Volume 5, Number 1, March 2003.
2Davis and Steil (2001)
3Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner (1994), and many
others have argued that well-informed institutional investors with a substantial equity stake can exert inﬂuence and
reduce the agency problem between managers and shareholders with positive ramiﬁcations on ﬁrm value.
4Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), and many others have oﬀered emipirical evidence.
1in ﬁrm acquisition activity, the preference-related component represents the part of the institutional
ownership which corresponds to the future shocks. By construction, the noise component is not
correlated with the shocks, and is utilized as an instrumental variable for the institutional ownership.
Second, I borrow the concept of “Bartik instrument” from labor research (Bartik (1991), Blanchard
and Katz (1992)), by interacting exogenous shocks to an institutional investor’s portfolio with its
propensity to invest in a given ﬁrm. The assumption is that institutions’ portfolio sizes vary
exogenously half a year (on average) prior to M&A announcements. Institutional ownership is
instrumented with this Bartik instrument to address the ownership endogeneity. The validity of
both identiﬁcation assumptions are further discussed in the later part of this paper.
Most of the prior studies on institutional investor focus on the impact of shareholder proxy
proposals targeting governance issues. While this is the most visible governance activity by institu-
tional investors, there are several reasons to suspect that event responses to proxy proposals do not
fully represent the impact of shareholder activism. First, proxy proposals are advisory rather than
binding (Pound (1988), Gordon and Pound (1993)). Managers are not obliged to adopt these pro-
posals even if they receive a majority vote from shareholders. The data used in event studies which
examine announcement stock returns will inevitably include many shareholder proposals that are
never implemented.5 Consequently, it is not surprising that stock price reactions to these events
are modest and diﬃcult to detect. Second, proposals will be withdrawn and thus not disclosed if
management voluntarily adopts them. The inclusion of the proposal in the proxy materials may
reﬂect the management’s negative response to shareholder concerns, and may thus be associated
with negative stock market reactions (Prevost and Rao (2000)).
In this paper, I conduct a new test of the impact of institutional investors on the governance of
5For example, in 1988, USAIR did not adopt CalPERS’ anti-poison pill proxy resolution although the proposal
received a majority of votes (Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)). Wahal (1996) documents that 40 percent of proxy
proposals on governance structures changes initiated by public pension funds were adopted by target ﬁrms.
2ﬁrms by examining a major corporate event — M&A activity. In particular, I provide the ﬁrst test
of whether the presence of an institutional investor reduces M&A activities that lower ﬁrm values.
M&A activity provides a natural test of the eﬃcacy of institutional investor activism. It occurs
frequently and can have a substantial eﬀect on ﬁrm values. Theories suggest that mergers can occur
for good reasons, such as capturing synergy gains, or for bad reasons, such as agency costs. Many
papers, both theoretical and empirical, have argued that M&A can be motivated by managerial
incentives and reduce shareholder wealth, such as Amihud and Lev (1981), Roll (1986), Agrawal and
Mandelker (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Avery, Chevalier,
and Schaefer (1998), etc. Evidence on bidder performance, both at the announcement and in the
long-run, suggests that not all acquisitions are beneﬁcial for bidder shareholders (Jensen and Ruback
(1983), Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001), Agrawal, Jaﬀe, and Mandelker (1992), Loughran
and Vijh (1997), Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000), etc.). A recent study by Moeller, Schlingemann,
and Stulz (2003) show that bidders on average lose $25.2 million upon announcement, from 1980
to 2001.
Some bidders are more likely to perform worse than others. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991)
ﬁnd that bidder returns are signiﬁcantly lower for low q bidders with high cash ﬂows, which suﬀer
higher agency costs by Jensen’s free cash ﬂow theory, than low q bidders with low cash ﬂows. Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggest that managerial objectives drive value-reducing acquisitions,
for example, “buying-growth” acquisition. If institutional investors eﬀectively monitor, then their
presence should reduce the likelihood of “bad” M&A driven by managerial incentives, but not
“good” M&A.
I ﬁnd that major public pension funds (PPFs) are playing exactly this role. PPFs have a sub-
stantial eﬀect on M&A activity. Their inﬂuence is concentrated in the value-reducing acquisitions,
namely, when the acquirer is cash-rich and low-q, or is just “buying-growth”. Ceteris paribus, a
31% increase in the largest PPF ownership associates with a 2%-10% reduction in subsequent M&A
likelihood for cash rich and low q ﬁrms. Because less than one in three of ﬁrm-years in the sample
are M&A observations, this absolute reduction translates into a 7%-30% relative reduction in M&A
frequency. PPFs also do not reduce M&A activity when it is more likely to be good. Acquisitions
by cash-poor and low-q ﬁrms on average have positive announcement abnormal returns and positive
long-term abnormal returns in my sample. PPFs have no eﬀect among these ﬁrms. Overall, when
ﬁrms with large PPF shareholders do undertake acquisitions, their long-run performance (including
the announcement month) is better.
The presence of other types of institutions either has no eﬀect or has the opposite eﬀect. The
results on investment companies (mostly mutual funds) are particularly interesting. Mutual fund
ownership is positively associated with future M&A activity in the whole sample. This association
is the strongest among ﬁrms with few growth opportunities and a lot of free cash, and among
the bidders which “buy growth”, i.e., those more likely to suﬀer agency costs. In the long-term,
acquirers with more mutual fund ownership also perform worse in the stock market. The evidence
suggests that for ﬁrms suﬀering the most agency conﬂicts, more mutual fund ownership may insulate
the management from more scrutiny and actually encourage more bad M&A.
The evidence of this paper suggests that major public pension funds are the only eﬀective
monitors among all institutions. PPFs held 8% of the total U.S. equity market by 2001 (The
Conference Board), compared with over 50% owned by all institutions. They are know to be
activists of corporate governance. Gillan and Starks (2000) document that PPFs are the most active
in governance activities ranging from highly public proxy targeting to closed-door negotiations. In
the hotly contested acquisition of Compaq by Hewlett-Packard in 2002, six major public pension
funds6 publicly announced that they would vote against the deal.
6They are: the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), the California State Teachers’ Re-
tirement System, New York’s common Retirement Fund, New York State Teachers Retirement Fund, the Public
4There are two possible mechanisms for PPFs to have an eﬀect. First, if the presence of the
monitor signals credible promise of punishing value-reducing actions, the management will not
carry out those M&A deals motivated by managerial incentives. Secondly, if the monitor has the
capacity to judge the quality of individual transactions and eﬀectively intervene, it can directly
reduce the frequency of negative bidder NPV M&A. Although the ﬁrst mechanism cannot be
observed directly, there are anecdotal evidences such as the HP-Compaq incident supporting the
existence of the second mechanism. CalPERS states its position on M&A as:7 “we examine M&A
activity closely ... we look at each situation to determine what course of actions is best for the
long-term returns of our Fund.” This statement also suggests that the second mechanism does
exist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a literature review
on institutional shareholder activism. Section II describes the speciﬁcation and the identiﬁcation
strategy. Section III describes data. Section IV and V discuss institutional ownership impact on
M&A likelihood and M&A performance. Section VI concludes the paper.
I Literature Review
Empirical work has not produced much evidence on the role of institutional investors. Most studies
on institutional investor activism (Gillan and Starks (2000), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999),
Karpoﬀ, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Wahal (1996), etc.) focused on institutions’ activity in
submitting proxy proposals. They found inconclusive results. Other studies (Hartzell and Starks
(2002), Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), Song and Szewczyk
(2003), etc.) examine institutions’ non-proxy activity, such as their impact on compensation policy,
Employee’s Retirement Association of Colorado, and the Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio.
7Quote from email exchanges with Ted White, Director of Corporate Governance at CalPERS, in 2004.
5CEO turnover, and market response to corporate event. However, few have discussed in detail how
to control for ownership endogeneity.
There is also a large literature regarding the heterogeneity among diﬀerent types of institutions.
Black (1990) argues that PPFs are in the forefront of institutional shareholder activism due to their
size and independence. Several other characteristics of PPFs also encourage and facilitate their roles
as monitors of corporate governance. First, although most institutional investors at least partially
outsource the management of their assets to external money managers, public pension funds appear
to retain eﬀective voting control of their assets. In 1993, PPFs retained voting control over 98.9%
of the stocks they owned, compared to only 66.4% for the average institutional investor (Brancato
(1993)). Retention of voting power provides the means of activism. Second, indexing strategies are
common among PPFs. Davis and Steil (2001) document that indexation accounts for 54% of public
pension funds’ domestic equity and only 24% of that of corporate funds. Gillan and Starks (2000)
argue that selling constraints imposed by indexing strategies can provide an important motivation
for shareholder activism aimed at improving overall market performance.8
On the other hand, PPFs may suﬀer their own agency costs and thus may not be eﬀective mon-
itors. Romano (1993) argues that the political pressure faced by the managers of public pension
funds may conﬂict with the goal of proﬁt maximization. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) ﬁnd that
state pension system oﬃcials manage the funds “more conservatively than their corporate counter-
parts to avoid drawing negative attention to the pension system.” Woidtke (2002) ﬁnds that ﬁrm
relative values are negatively related with public pension ownership.9
In contrast to PPFs, other institutional investors may not want to be active monitors. Roe
(1994) argues that legal restrictions often prevent banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds
8In a speech at Stanford University, March 21, 1996, Richard Koppes, former chief counsel of CalPERS, remarked,
“It makes sense for us to try to raise the ocean in order to lift our boat.”
9However, the instrument used in her paper is found to be a weak instrument in my study.
6etc., from owning large blocks of shares, and reduce their incentives to monitor. Black (1990) argues
that these institutions suﬀer conﬂicts of interest and remain pro-manager. For example, mutual
funds who manage 401(k)s or deﬁned contribution pension plans for corporations may feel the
pressure to vote pro-manager, and may be reluctant to develop anti-management reputations for
fear of losing current or prospective clients; Indeed, Pound (1988) and Brickley, Lease, and Smith
(1988) document that institutions such as banks and insurance companies are more likely to side
with management in proxy contests. Van Nuys (1993) ﬁnds that banks and insurance companies
are more supportive of management in the proxy solicitation and restructuring at Honeywell in
1989.
On the other hand, there is also anecdotal evidence that these institutions, especially mutual
funds, may have on occasion been viable monitors. For example, in 1992, Vanguard was involved
in the succession and retirement of Chrysler’s then-Chairman Lee Iacocca.
II Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation Strategy
The structural equation is:
yit = β0 + β1InstOwnershipit + φXit + γY eart + ui + it, (1)
where yit, the dependent variable, is a dummy variable measuring ﬁrms’ M&A activity. It equals
one when there is at least one M&A announcement during the 12-month period. t is a time subscript.
An i denotes each ﬁrm. ui is the ﬁrm-level eﬀect. The ownership variables InstOwnershipit (Public
Pension Funds, Investment Companies, Others) are the variables of interest in this study. The
Xit is a vector of control variables including managerial ownership, managerial compensation, the
governance index, prior M&A activity, leverage ratio, cash ﬂow ratio, q ratio, ﬁrm size, capital
7expenditures ratio, ﬁrm prior performance, and industrial concentration. Table I explains in detail
what these variables are. The Y earts are year dummies.
Since the structural equation controls for past acquisition activity, the ownership variables may
be endogenous if institutions are able to predict future shocks to M&A activity, and adjust their
ownership accordingly.
The ﬁrst instrument utilizes information contained in ﬁrms’ prior acquisition expenditures and
in institutional investors’ asset allocations. I start by identifying each ﬁrm’s “acquisitiveness” using
its average acquisition expenditure (Compustat items data129/data6) in last ﬁve years. Next I ﬁnd
a “preference score” (FundPreferencejt), fund preference for acquisition, for an institutional investor





wj,it denotes the portfolio weight of ﬁrm i’s stock in fund j’s portfolio at time period t.
For each ﬁrm, the “preference score” (FundPreferenceit) of each type of its institutional investors
is the score of the largest investor within that type.10 Using this institution “preference”, I can
orthogonalize each year the institutional ownership of ﬁrm i into the acquisition preference related
and the non-acquisition related components by running a ﬁxed eﬀect regression,11
InstOwnershipit = α + βFundPreferenceit + ui + eit. (3)
The identifying assumption is that fund preference is stable over a period of one year (own-
10If I use the weighted “FundPreference” of all institutions within each category as the measure for aggregate
ownership, the estimations are similar.
11The earlier draft utilized a tobit regression with ﬁrm-level eﬀect, since ownership is censored at zero. Results
were similar.
8ership at end of June, year t, and M&A activity observed from July, year t to June, year t+1).
Mutual funds often advertise themselves as following a certain style of investment since incipiency.
Furthermore, institutions often hire their money managers for multiple years. It is reasonable to
assume that individual money managers have relatively stable preferences. If institutional investors
are able to predict future M&A shocks, and adjust their holdings prior to the M&A event, then
FundPreferenceit should capture this M&A related component of ownership. By construction,
eit is orthorgonal to institutions’ M&A preference. This non-acquisition related component (eit) is
used as an instrument to identify the institutional eﬀect in the M&A context. I call this variable
“NA ownership”. “NA” stands for non-acquisition.
The sample starts in year 1992, the ﬁrst year executive compensation data is available. For-
tunately, accounting information is available for a much longer period. I am able to construct the
“preference score” measure for each ﬁrm-year. For ﬁrms with zero institutional ownership, this
measure is set to zero.
The second instrument variable is a so-called “Bartik instrument”. The underlying assumption
of the approach is that a given institution’s portfolio size is exogenous. There are two factors
aﬀecting the fund size. One is the net inﬂow of funds. If individual investors prefer acquisitive
ﬁrms, can predict future M&A shocks, and can identify a particular mutual fund as having the same
preference and the same predictive power, then the fund ﬂow can be endogenous. However, there
are few reasons to believe that this scenario is likely to be true. For example, no existing mutual
fund advertises itself as M&A-driven. The net inﬂows of pension funds are determined by generally
ﬁxed contributions of their members and their liabilities, which are most likely exogenous. The
second factor aﬀecting fund sizes is the performance of their portfolio, which in turn is determined
by the current stock price. M&A announcements are often considered surprises. There may be
rumors and trading activity in the couple of days leading to an announcement. However, the market
9is not able to predict M&A activity in an average time horizon of six months. Consequently, the
current stock price most likely has not incorporated the future shocks to the M&A likelihood.
The Bartik instrument interacts the exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolio sizes
with the ﬁrm-level propensity of investment, which is obtained as the ﬁxed eﬀects from the following
regression by each institutional investor j:
InstOwnershipit = β0 + β1FundSizeit + ωi + eit (4)
ωi can be considered as j’s propensity to invest in ﬁrm i. It is not correlated with future M&A
shocks, which is captured by eit. ωi is ﬁrm speciﬁc, and does not vary across time. The institutional
investor j’s portfolio size varies across time, but not across ﬁrm. The Bartik instrument interacts the
two, and varies across both ﬁrm and time. Similar to the ﬁrst instrument variable, I use the value
from the largest institutional investor within each category to instrument for both the aggregate
ownership and the largest individual ownership of each category of institutional investors.
To check that both instruments are valid, I exam the F-statistics from the ﬁrst-stage IV regres-
sions. The F-stats are much greater than ten. Neither suﬀers weak instrument problem (Staiger
and Stock (1997)).
Other variables used as controls may also be endogenous. When I exclude all controls from the
regressions, results are even stronger. The potential endogeneity of the control variables does not
bias the estimates on the ownership variables, which are the focus of this study. Since a detailed
discussion of the control variables is beyond the scope of this paper, this issue is left for future
explorations.
10III Data
The initial sample is the overlap between CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases, with executive
compensation data available from the Execucomp database, and governance index data available
from IRRC. Corporate ﬁnancial information is obtained from COMPUSTAT and stock performance
data is from CRSP. Execucomp lists each ﬁrm in the S&P 1500 (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and
S&P SmallCap 600). The sample is limited to securities identiﬁed by CRSP as ordinary common
shares (with share codes 10, 11 or 12). This excludes American Depository Receipts, closed-end-
funds, primes and scores, and Real Estate Investment Trusts. Utilities, ﬁnance and insurance
companies, and government agencies (2-digit SIC code 49, from 60 to 69, and above 89) are also
excluded. Finally, ﬁrms with December market capitalization less than one-hundredth the level
of the S&P 500 index are dropped out of the sample. For example, in 1995, the S&P500 closed
at 615.93. The minimum market cap of ﬁrms in 1995 in this sample was $6.1593 million. This
is to ensure that results are not driven by small ﬁrms. Only a small number of observations are
eliminated by this requirement. Results do not change if these ﬁrms are included in the study.
Mergers and acquisitions information is obtained from the SDC domestic M&A database by
Thomson Financial. To be included, a deal has to be completed with an acquisition of 100% of the
target. The total number of M&A deals increases by 132 when deals in which acquirers acquired
majorities of the targets are included. The results of the study do not change materially if the
criterion of M&A deal inclusion is majority ownership of targets instead of 100% ownership. Both
disclosed value and non-disclosed value deals are included, but disclosed value deals must have a
value of at least 1 million. The ﬁnal M&A data contains both public and private targets (from
July 1993 to June 2001). The following table provides a summary. Average deal values (in million
dollars) are reported in parentheses.
11Target public company Target non-public
disclosed non-disclosed disclosed non-disclosed
Acquirer acquired 100% of the target 487 1 1,286 1,859
($2,050.30) ($252.99)
Acquirer acquired between 26 1 55 50
50% and 100% of the target ($1,247.43) ($282.98)
Due to multiple announcements during the 12-month period, the ﬁnal M&A sample consists of
2,022 ﬁrm-year observations. Out of this total, 873 observations are for disclosed value M&A only,
760 observations are for undisclosed value M&A only, and 389 observations are for both types.
The institutional ownership data is obtained from Thomson Financial.12 I identify public pen-
sion funds by their names in the Thomson database. In total I ﬁnd 15 public pension funds:13
California public employees retirement system (CalPERS), California state teachers retirement
system, Colorado public employees retirement association, Florida state board of administration,
Kentucky teachers retirement system, Michigan state treasury, Montana board of investment, New
Mexico educational retirement board, New York state common retirement fund, New York state
teachers retirement system, Ohio public employees retirement system, Ohio school employees re-
tirement system, Ohio state teachers retirement system, Virginia retirement system, and State of
Wisconsin investment board. At the end of June 2000, the average size of equity assets under man-
agement is $25.17 billion, and the median is $24.65 billion (the largest fund is CalPERS [$63.53
billion], the smallest is New Mexico educational retirement board [$1.51 billion]). My results remain
12Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 13f), institutional investment managers who exercise investment
discretion over accounts with publicly traded securities (section 13(f) securities) and who hold equity portfolios
exceeding $100 million are required to ﬁle Form 13f within 45 days after the last day of each quarter. Investment
managers must report all holdings in excess of 10,000 shares and/or with a market value over $200,000.
13Not all state and local pension funds holdings are available, because either they are too small and do not ﬁle 13f,
or their assets are reported by outside money managers.
12the same if CalPERS, the most visible activist fund, is excluded. About 2% of the observations
have zero PPF ownership. The mutual fund ownership is what Thomson classiﬁed as investment
company ownership. The rest are classiﬁed as other institutional ownership.14 Two diﬀerent vari-
ables are used to measure institutional ownership: 1) The aggregate holdings by each category; 2)
The largest individual holdings within each category.
A ﬁrm-level shareholder rights variable (the governance index) is obtained from Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003), which quantiﬁes ﬁrm-level provisions of 24 governance rules (mostly takeover
related). A higher index value reﬂects weaker shareholder rights. This index is available for the full
sample of Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) ﬁrms for each publication of Corporate
Takeover Defenses [Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000]. For years (1992, 1994, 1996, 1997,
1999) during which there is no publication to provide up-to-date governance provision information,
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shows the timeline of the research design. During calendar year t, corporate accounting data,
insider ownership data, and executive compensation data are recorded. The majority of ﬁrms end
their ﬁscal years in December. At the end of June, year t+1, institutional ownership is recorded.
The six-month lag ensures that all relevant information is public when institutional ownership data
14The earlier draft of this paper classiﬁed the institutional ownership into six types. The other four were: insurance
companies, banks, independent advisors, and private pension funds. Because those four types are generally not
signiﬁcant, I group them together as other institutional investors.
13is considered. If the ﬁrm announces at least one merger and/or acquisition deal during the period
July, year t+1 to June, year t+2, this ﬁrm is considered to be an M&A ﬁrm for data year t.
Thomson Financial institutional ownership data is available until 2000 at the time of this study.
Execucomp data is available from 1992. Thus my ﬁnal sample covers ﬁrms from 1992 to 1999. Each
year, their corresponding institutional ownership (with a 6-month lag) is from end of June holdings
in the following year (1993 to 2000); their merger and acquisition data (with a minimum 6-month
lag) is collected from July the following year to June two years after. There are 1,362 ﬁrms and a
total of 6,681 ﬁrm-year observations.
Table I provides a detailed description of all variables. All relevant data are CPI-adjusted. Table
II shows that this sample is primarily larger ﬁrms. In 1992 dollars, the median market capitalization
is $1,008.99 million and the median total assets are $905.57 million. Ranked by year-end market
capitalization each year, 5,745 observations (88%) are above the median market capitalization of
NYSE and AMEX ﬁrms. Results remain if only those ﬁrms are included. Thus, my conclusions
are not driven by the smaller ﬁrms in the sample.
Among the 6,681 ﬁrm-year observations, there are in total 2,022 (30%) M&A observations.
Firms in M&A ﬁrm-year observations are larger, have lower insider ownership, higher governance
index, higher cash ﬂow ratios, higher q ratios, lower capital expenditures ratios, and better prior
performance than those in non-M&A ﬁrm-year observations. A total of 147 observations (2.2%)
have zero PPF ownership. 11 (7.5%) of those are M&A observations.
IV Institutional Ownership and Likelihood of M&A
It is easier for managers to undertake “bad” M&A when there is no eﬀective monitoring. Controlling
for the ﬁrm-level governance structure and ﬁrm characteristics which may aﬀect M&A likelihood,
14we would expect to observe, ceteris paribus, that ﬁrms without eﬀective institutional monitoring
are more likely to engage in M&A activity than ﬁrms with eﬀective institutional monitoring. In
this section I examine whether institutional ownership reduces M&A frequency in the full sample,
and particularly for the value-reducing ones in the subsamples.
A Full Sample Results
I report the results from the pooled logit model and the ﬁxed eﬀect IV model. The pooled logit
model includes year and industry dummies as controls. The IV model allows for ﬁrm-level unob-
served heterogeneity in mergers and acquisitions decisions, and utilizes both the time-series and
the cross-sectional dimensions of the data. Unobserved industry-level heterogeneity is incorporated
in this ﬁrm-level eﬀects. During the sample period 1992-1999, the telecommunication and broad-
casting industry went through major deregulation (1996). Dummy variables capturing this shock
are not signiﬁcant after controling for ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects.
Institutional Ownership Variables I ﬁnd that the overall institutional ownership (sum of
all types) is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with future M&A activity. I then decompose the
overall institutional ownership into three types as detailed earlier, and report results on diﬀerent
types of institutional ownership.
Table III reports the ﬁrst-stage from the IV regressions, which provide information on factors
inﬂuencing various institutional ownership. The “NA” instruments are constructed by decompos-
ing the respective institutional ownership, and acquisition preference is only one factor among
many inﬂuencing institutions’ investment decisions, as a result, the loading on the same-category
instrument is very close to one. The potential bias in the IV estimation, which is scaled by this
correlation, is likely to be very small (Staiger and Stock (1997)).
There is no evidence that public pension funds prefer ﬁrms with better governance structure
15measured by the governance index. There is also no consistent evidence that institutions avoid ﬁrms
with prior M&A activity. I use two independent dummy variables to measure ﬁrms’ prior M&A
activities.15 The ﬁrst dummy equals one if a ﬁrm announced a deal in the prior year which received
positive announcement abnormal return, and it equals zero for all others. The second dummy
equals one if a ﬁrm announced a deal in the prior year which received negative announcement
abnormal return, and zero for the rest.
The results from the second stage IV regressions are reported in Table IV. PPF ownership has a
negative and signiﬁcant impact on M&A. This impact remains signiﬁcant and is economically larger
when I exclude all other controls. Although the control variables can potentially be endogenous,
they do not bias the estimations on the variables of interest. Other institutional investors mostly
have either a positive eﬀect or no eﬀect on M&A likelihood.
Controls Table IV also includes other variables. From the perspective of my study, they are
primarily controls, and not a focus or subject of interest. Thus I discuss the ﬁndings only brieﬂy.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) constructed an index on shareholder rights by examining
ﬁrm-level governance rules, most of which are anti-takeover provisions. This index is especially
relevant in the context of this study. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) ﬁnd that ﬁrms that make value-
reducing acquisitions become takeover targets. Thus a higher level of anti-takeover protection may
insulate the management from possible takeovers following a bad acquisition, and consequently
encourages bad acquisitions. On the other hand, the management may want more protection
because the ﬁrms are likely target, hence are less likely to do acquistion themselves. Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with stronger shareholder rights (lower index value) made
fewer corporate acquisitions. However, their study didn’t control for the endogeneity issue. After
controling for ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects, I show that ﬁrms with weaker shareholder rights (higher index
15The strict exogeneity assumption of panel data models excludes lagged dependent variables(Wooldridge (2001)).
This two-dummy approach is to avoid this issue. Results are similar without the inclusion of these two dummies.
16value) actually made fewer acquisitions.
When CEOs receive more option grants in their compensation packages, ﬁrms are more likely to
undertake M&A. If M&A activity adds risk, this result suggests that options encourage risk-taking
behavior. However, M&A could also be motivated to reduce risk (diversiﬁcation for example).
Thus the role of options in the context of M&A activity is unclear. In Jensen and Meckling (1976),
larger managerial equity ownership aligns managerial incentives with those of outside shareholders.
There is some evidence in the data that insider ownership is signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated
with M&A likelihood.
Several ﬁrm characteristics variables also matter for M&A activity.
1. Firm prior M&A activity and ﬁrm size are signiﬁcantly and positively related to M&A activity
in the cross section. However, for one particular ﬁrm, prior activity reduces future activity.
2. Tobin’s q ratio is positively and signiﬁcantly related to future M&A likelihood.
3. There is a substitution eﬀect between capital expenditures and M&A activity.
4. M&A activity is motivated by a ﬁrm’s prior performance.16 It is possible that ﬁrms either
extrapolate their prior performance when making investment decisions or take advantage of
their relatively high valuations.
B Subsample Results
Some mergers and acquisitions can create value for the acquirers. It is important to know if PPFs
have the ability to diﬀerentiate between good and bad M&A ex ante, and thus discourage bad deals;
16I use four measures for prior performance: one-year sales growth rate, cumulative abnormal returns using the
benchmark method, cumulative abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-factor model, and buy-and-hold abnormal
returns. I report my results using benchmarked CAR throughout this paper. Results using other measures are similar
both in economic and statistical signiﬁcance, and are available upon request.
17or, if the presence of PPF investors deters managers from undertaking M&A, whether it deters the
bad M&A only.
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggest worse perfor-
mance for cash rich, low q acquirers and “buying-growth” acquirers. Table V conﬁrms it.
Low q ﬁrms and cash rich ﬁrms are classiﬁed independently. Each year, ﬁrms with q ratios less
than the sample median are classiﬁed as low q ﬁrms. Annual median q ratios vary from 1.31 to
1.60. Half of the original observations are classiﬁed as low q observations. Cash richness is deﬁned
as the ratio of non-current-debt cash and cash equivalents to non-cash total assets (see table I).
Each year, ﬁrms with above industry (by 4-digit SIC code) median cash holdings are classiﬁed as
cash-rich ﬁrms. To deﬁne which deal is “buying growth”, I need accounting data for the targets.
Target growth rate is deﬁned to be the 3-year sales growth rate prior to the takeover. Deals with
target sales growth above the sample median are considered to be “buying growth.”
Table V reports that among the low q ﬁrms, the market responds more favorably towards M&A
news when the acquirer is cash poor: cash rich ones have insigniﬁcant announcement abnormal
returns, while cash poor ones have signiﬁcant and positive announcement abnormal returns at
68 basis points on average (equal weight). The value-weighted announcement abnormal return is
negative for cash-rich and low q ﬁrms, and positive for cash poor and low q ﬁrms. “Buying-growth”
M&A receives signiﬁcantly negative announcement abnormal returns, while “non-buying-growth”
M&A announcement abnormal returns are insigniﬁcant. When I look at long-term performance
over a 12-month period including the announcement month, cash poor low q ﬁrms and “non-buying-
growth” ﬁrms appear to perform better.
If PPF monitoring is eﬀective, I would expect PPF ownership to: 1) have a more pronounced
eﬀect in the cash rich group than the cash poor group among the low q ﬁrms; 2) reduce the likelihood
of “buying-growth” M&A. I ﬁnd strong support for eﬀective PPF monitoring.
18Cash Rich Low-q vs Cash Poor Low-q Table VI shows that the PPF impact among low
q ﬁrms is concentrated in the cash rich ﬁrms, which suggests PPFs’ ability to reduce ex ante
bad M&A. A 1% increase in the largest PPF ownership leads to a 1.8%-9.7% reduction in M&A
likelihood, larger than its impact in the whole sample. PPF ownership has no impact in the cash
poor low q subsample. On the contrary, there is some evidence that mutual fund ownership is
positively associated with more M&A activity in the cash rich low q group.
Buying-growth M&A Table VII looks at PPFs’ impact on the likelihood of “buying-growth”
M&A. PPFs reduce the likelihood of “buying growth” M&A: a 1% increase in the largest PPF
ownership reduces the probability of buying a fast-growing target by 8%. Again, on the contrary,
investment company (mostly mutual funds) ownership is positively correlated with “buying-growth”
M&A.
V Institutional Ownership and Performance of M&A
This section looks at bidder long-term stock abnormal returns (including the announcement month),
and bidder post-M&A operating performance to judge whether an M&A deal is good or bad.
Appendix A provides the details on the methodologies measuring the performance.
The primary goal of examing long-term stock abnormal returns is not to test for market eﬃ-
ciency. It diﬀers from the studies by Barber and Lyon (1997), Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) and
others, because it includes the announcement month in the calculation of long-term abnormal
returns. Results are similar if I look at post-M&A performance only.
Table VIII reports the results on long-term abnormal returns over twelve months, including the
announcement month. The long-term abnormal returns may provide a better measure of M&A
performance since the measure of announcement abnormal returns can be noisy.17 For example,
17If I look at the announcement abnormal returns only, PPF ownership is insigniﬁcant, and mutual fund ownership
19Mitchell, Pulvino, and Staﬀord (2004) ﬁnd that nearly half of the negative acquirer announcement
stock return reﬂects price pressure caused by merger arbitrage.
It appears that M&A ﬁrms with higher PPF ownership perform relatively better in the long-
run. A one percent increase in the largest PPF investor is correlated with an increase in abnormal
return by 0.40%-2.95% per year. In contrast, investment company ownership correlates negatively
with long-run abnormal returns.
I also checked whether PPF ownership is correlated with M&A stock performance within the
cash rich low q group, but was unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association. It is possibly due to limited
sample size (less than 400 ﬁrm-years and 261 ﬁrms).
The operating performance of the M&A ﬁrms within my sample, as measured by both operating
cash ﬂow returns and cash ﬂow margin on sales, is on average better than their industry median
both pre- and post-M&A. Consistent with ﬁndings in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), their
performance as measured by these two benchmarks improve after their acquisitions. Post-M&A
industry-adjusted cash ﬂow returns on average increase by 1.53% as compared to their pre-M&A
levels; post-M&A industry-adjusted cash ﬂow margins on average increase by 5.38% as compared
to pre-M&A levels. Both improvements are statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 1% signiﬁcance
level.
However when I look at their asset turnover rates, they performed worse on average than the
industry median both before and after M&A. Also, their asset turnover rates appear to deteriorate
after the acquisitions’ completion. The decline is not statistically signiﬁcant except for the subgroup
of M&As with publicly traded targets.
Table IX reports that PPF ownership is positively associated with improvements in asset
turnover rates. An increase of 1% in the largest PPF investor is signiﬁcantly correlated with
is signiﬁcantly negative.
20an improvement of over 3 cents per dollar in the abnormal asset turnover rate. Earlier results show
a positive relation between PPF ownership and twelve-month stock abnormal returns, thus this
positive association between PPF ownership and abnormal asset turnover rate is less likely to be
driven by a relatively low market valuation of ﬁrm assets.
VI Robustness check
In a contemporaneous and independent paper, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004) ﬁnd that institu-
tional investors’ investment horizon impacts ﬁrms’ M&A activity. However, their study does not
address the potential endogeneity in institutional ownership. They also deﬁne activist investors
by membership in the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), the majority of which are private
pension funds and small public pension funds which outsource the management of their assets.
Song and Szewczyk (2003) ﬁnd little evidence that the CII has been eﬀective in its activist activ-
ity. This membership variable is unlikely to capture the activism impact by major public pension
funds. When I include investment horizon variables for various types of institutional investors in
the regressions, my results remain. A further discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Chen,
Harford, and Li (2005) provide a more detailed study.
If I measure M&A activity by the deal size, the results are similar. The full sample includes
undisclosed deal value M&A. When I restrict the sample to M&A with disclosed deal value, I ﬁnd
that 1% increase in the largest PPF ownership reduces about $109 million dollars in deal size. The
aggregate PPF ownership has a similar but smaller economic eﬀect. Investment company ownership
encourages bigger deals on the other hand. 1% increase in the largest mutual fund ownership leads
to $79 million more in deal size. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003) ﬁnd that value-reducing
M&A occurs mostly in big deals. Thus PPF’s negative eﬀect on deal value may be correlated with
21better M&A overall.
I also studied the sample of ﬁrms from 1980 to 1999 without the inclusion of executive compen-
sation data and insider ownership data (since those data are available only from 1992). The results
remain similar.
If I measure the institutional ownership using two diﬀerent measures: 1) A dummy variable
which equals one if there is at least one 5% block holder within a category; 2) The Herﬁndahl
concentration, The results remain similar.
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) construct an entrenchment index based on six governance
provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). They show that these
six provisions fully drive the correlation identiﬁed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and that
the other eighteen IRRC provisions in the governance index are not negatively correlated with
either ﬁrm value or stock returns during the 1990-2003 period. I replace the governance index with
their entrenchment index in the regressions. There is no material changes.
When I look at a much longer horizon, the negative relation between PPF ownership and future
M&A remains. I examine whether institutional ownership at the end of June, 1993 can predict
M&A frequency in the eight years from July, 1993 to June, 2000. A 1% increase in the largest PPF
ownership is associated with a 4% reduction in the number of M&As in eight years.
I also model the interaction between institutional ownership and future M&A using a simulta-
neous equations system. This model assumes that public pension fund ownership and ﬁrm M&A
activity can have reciprocal inﬂuence on each other. The results conﬁrm that the negative impact
of PPF ownership on M&A activity is strong and signiﬁcant.
22VII Conclusions
As Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) point out, the hostile takeover market, which served as a disci-
plinary force in the 1980s, has largely disappeared in the 1990s. Furthermore, various antitakeover
measures adopted by management in the 90s have rendered takeover market ineﬀective (Bebchuk,
Coates IV, and Subramanian (2002)). Black (1992) and Pound (1992) thus argue that the market-
and-transaction-based system of corporate governance has evolved into a political model of monitor-
ing. However, empirical research by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Yermack (1996), and Shivdasani
and Yermack (1999), among many others, have cast doubts on the eﬀectiveness of monitoring by
the board of directors. There are also many studies examining institutional investor activism, yet
few existing ones have documented strong evidence.
My paper documents a strong eﬀect on corporate M&A activity by one class of institutions,
major public pension funds. After controlling for ownership endogeneity, ﬁrm-level governance
structure, and ﬁrm characteristics, my study has shown that PPF ownership reduces the likelihood
of buying other ﬁrms. The reduction in M&A activity is greater in cases with higher potential
agency conﬂict, i.e., for ﬁrms with low q ratios but high free cash ﬂows, and for ﬁrms seeking to
buy fast-growing targets. PPF ownership is also positively correlated with long-run M&A abnormal
returns. Overall, I believe that there is enough evidence to support the argument that public pension
funds are eﬀective monitors of corporate M&A activity.
Ownership by investment companies is positively correlated with M&A likelihood among ﬁrms
with higher agency costs. The aggregate investment company ownership is negatively associated
with both announcement abnormal returns and long-run M&A abnormal returns. Given these
ﬁndings, investment companies appear to be the least likely monitors among all types of institutions.
The fact that investment company ownership is negatively correlated with M&A stock performance
23in the long-run is not explained by the “preference” story, and may instead be more consistent with
the story that their presence encourages value-reducing activity by ﬁrm management. However,
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) demonstrate in their model that a rational manager may undertake an
acquisition when the stock is overvalued by an irrational market. In this scenario, M&A is not
value-reducing for bidder shareholders at all, despite the post-event drop in stock price as the true
valuation is revealed.
The variables on managerial incentives are primarily control variables in this study. It would
be interesting to further pursue the eﬀect of managerial incentives on managers’ M&A decisions.
It is very possible that factors such as agency costs, which aﬀect ﬁrms’ M&A activity, also aﬀect
ﬁrm-level managerial incentives. This endogeneity problem should be addressed in further studies.
Appendix A: Measuring Performance
M&A bidder stock performance is measured by both the announcement abnormal return and the long-
run abnormal return. For announcement abnormal returns, I follow standard event study methodology
to calculate CARs for the three-day window (-1,1) around the announcement date supplied by SDC. The
abnormal returns are estimated using a modiﬁed market model:
ARi = ri − rm,
where ri is the return on ﬁrm i and rm is the value-weighted market index return. If there are mul-
tiple announcements during the 12-month period, I take the average abnormal announcement return of all
announcements during the period.
Measuring long-term abnormal performance is diﬃcult. Barber and Lyon (1997) advocate the use of
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over cumulative abnormal returns. They document that cumulative abnor-
mal returns are most aﬀected by new listing bias, and are generally positively biased, while buy-and-hold
abnormal returns are generally negatively biased. Kothari and Warner (1997) caution that long-horizon
abnormal returns are severely misspeciﬁed. Fama (1998) argues that formal inferences about long-term ab-
normal returns should be based on averages or sums of short-term abnormal returns. Mitchell and Staﬀord
(2000) show that the conventional methodology of calculating multi-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns and
conducting inferences via a bootstrapping procedure is ﬂawed because the abnormal returns for event ﬁrms
are not independent. After accounting for the positive cross-correlations of event ﬁrm abnormal returns, they
ﬁnd no abnormal performance in their sample of mergers, seasoned equity oﬀerings, and share repurchases.
Brav (2000) uses a Bayesian approach in estimating long-term abnormal returns and ﬁnds the three-factor
model to be inconsistent with the long-term performance of IPOs.
Since no one measure appears to be perfect, I examine all three measures of long-term abnormal returns:
cumulative abnormal returns using the benchmark method, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and cumulative
abnormal returns using Fama-French 3-factor model.
Each month, NYSE/AMEX ordinary common stocks with prior book-to-market values are sorted into
10 size portfolios according to their market capitalizations at the beginning of the month. Within each size
portfolio, these stocks are further sorted into 5 groups according to their book-to-market values. The breaking
points for these 50 portfolios are used to place all ordinary common stocks with CRSP and COMPUSTAT
24coverage and prior book-to-market values (to mitigate the new listing bias) into 50 benchmark portfolios.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, benchmarked) are calculated over 12 months for individual event
ﬁrms, including the announcement month. When there are multiple announcements during a year, CAR is




where Rit is the simple monthly return on the common stock of ﬁrm i. Rbt is the equal-weighted average
monthly return of its benchmark portfolio.




t=1(1 + Rit) −
Q12
t=1(1 + Rbt).
Fama-French 3-factor monthly abnormal return is the αi from the time-series regression of the model:
Rit − Rft = αi + βi(Rmt − Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it,
where Rft is the return on three-month Treasury bills, Rmt is the return on the value-weighted market
index, SMBt is the diﬀerence between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio
of large stocks, and HMLt is the diﬀerence between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks
and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, 3-factor)
are then calculated as 12 ∗ αi for individual event ﬁrms.
Abnormal post M&A operating performance is measured by changes in industry-adjusted operating cash
ﬂow returns, cash ﬂow margins, and asset turnover rates that occur after the deal completion dates. We
follow methodologies used both in Barber and Lyon (1996) and in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992).
Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluate diﬀerent methodologies used to measure accounting-based operating
performance, and ﬁnd the change models to be more desirable than the level models. Firm-level operating
performance is adjusted by the industry median before M&A and after M&A. The changes in industry-
adjusted performance are the measure of M&A abnormal operating performance.
• Operating cash ﬂow return,
CF =
Operating Income[13]+Depreciation[14]+Goodwill[204]
Total Asset[6]-Book Value Of Equity[60]+Market Value Of Equity Beginning Of Year




• Asset turnover rate,
AT =
Sales[12]
Total Asset[6]-Book Value Of Equity[60]+Market Value Of Equity Beginning Of Year
These operating performance measures are not aﬀected by depreciation and goodwill. Thus, they allow
cross-section comparison of ﬁrms which used purchase accounting method and ﬁrms which used pooling-
of-interests accounting method. These measures are also not aﬀected by the methods of ﬁnancing used in
mergers because the interest expense is not deducted.
These measures are then adjusted by subtracting industry medians. Industry-adjusted operating cash
ﬂow return(IACF), industry-adjusted cash ﬂow margin on sales(IACFM), and industry-adjusted asset turnover
rate(IAAT) are calculated for the 3 years before the M&A completion year and the 3 years after the M&A
completion year.
The majority of my M&A sample acquired private targets. For the small number of M&As with publicly
traded targets, pre-M&A operating performance is calculated as the weighted average between the bidder
and the target. The weights are the bidder and the target’s market capitalizations at the beginning of the
year prior to the M&A completion year.
The median value of operating performance from the 3 years pre-M&A(IACFpre,i, IACFMpre,i, IAATpre,i)
and the median value of operating performance from the 3 years post-M&A(IACFpost,i, IACFMpost,i,
IAATpost,i) are used to calculate abnormal operating performance.
I use two methods of calculation. The ﬁrst one follows Barber and Lyon (1996). It is the diﬀerence
between post-M&A industry-adjusted performance and pre-M&A industry-adjusted performance:
25AIACFi = IACFpost,i − IACFpre,i
AIACFMi = IACFMpost,i − IACFMpre,i
AIAATi = IAATpost,i − IAATpre,i
The second method follows Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992). Taking into consideration that pre-M&A
operating performance may predict the post-M&A operating performance,
IACFpost,i = a1 + b1 ∗ IACFpre,i + i1
IACFMpost,i = a2 + b2 ∗ IACFMpre,i + i2
IAATpost,i = a3 + b3 ∗ IAATpre,i + i3
These regressions are run on the whole sample of M&A observations to get estimates of the coeﬃcients.
The abnormal operating performance of the individual acquirer is thus calculated as,
AIACFi = IACFpost,i − (a1 + b1 ∗ IACFpre,i)
AIACFMi = IACFMpost,i − (a2 + b2 ∗ IACFpre,i)
AIAATi = IAATpost,i − (a3 + b3 ∗ IAATpre,i)
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1Table II: Descriptive Statistics
The sample (6,681 observations) are all Execucomp ﬁrms (1992 – 1999) issuing ordinary common shares, with
Governance index available, and excluding utilities, ﬁnance and insurance companies and government agencies.
The institutional ownership data is from the end of June the following year. Therefore, there is a lag of minimum
six months between the ﬁrm characteristics data (including the insider ownership and executive compensation
data) and the institutional ownership data to ensure that characteristics-related information is all public. The
institutional “acquisition preference”, FundScorejt, was derived from the composition of the largest investor’s
portfolio within each category. This “preference” was then used to construct the ﬁrst instrumental variable for
institutional ownership, which is the error term (eit) in a ﬁxed eﬀect regression of institutional ownership regressed
on this “preference”, InstOwnershipit = α + βFundScorejt + ui + eit. By construction, this error term, called
“NA” ownership, is orthogonal to the acquisition-related institutional ownership. The second instrument variable
borrows the concept from so-called “Bartik” instrument. It is the interaction between an institutional investor’s
propensity to invest in each ﬁrm and its portfolio size. Each institutional investor j’s propensity to invest in a
ﬁrm i is measured as ui, the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀect, from the following estimation by each institutional investor:
InstOwnershipit = α + βFundSizet + ui + eit.
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Ownership Data
Aggregate public pension fund holdings (%) 3.14 2.44 2.47 0.00 20.25
Aggregate investment company holdings (%) 12.92 10.79 9.19 0.00 59.59
Aggregate other institutional holdings (%) 41.562 42.357 14.080 0.000 99.914
Largest individual public pension fund holdings (%) 1.42 0.80 1.81 0.00 18.39
Largest individual investment company holdings (%) 5.57 4.59 4.01 0.00 50.13
Largest individual other institutional holdings (%) 7.071 5.850 4.963 0.000 57.104
Institutional “Acquisition Preference”
Public pension funds 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.000 0.026
Investment companies 0.018 0.018 0.007 0.000 0.067
Others 0.019 0.017 0.010 0 0.130
Instrumental Variables - Version one
NA aggregate PPF 0.000 -0.050 1.537 -12.268 10.064
NA aggregate investment co. 0.000 -0.061 5.377 -22.713 38.760
NA others 0.000 0.000 7.955 -53.839 38.651
NA largest PPF 0.000 -0.023 1.056 -9.381 9.509
NA largest investment co. 0.000 -0.082 2.692 -9.990 36.889
NA largest others 0.000 -0.078 2.813 -32.038 40.847
Instrumental Variables - Version two
“Bartik” PPF 0.111 0.061 0.186 -0.224 1.877
“Bartik” investment co. 3.791 0.910 7.133 -6.137 60.805
“Bartik” others 0.760 0.326 1.683 -0.778 34.474
2Table II: Descriptive Statistics: continued
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Firm Characteristics
Total assets (millions, CPI-adjusted) 2,999.14 922.35 7,026.08 10.09 142,663.00
Market capitalization (millions, CPI-adjusted) 4,590.66 1,029.87 15,976.99 13.17 507,331.00
Q-ratio 1.88 1.33 2.08 0.27 46.11
Cash ﬂow ratio (%) 10.00 9.92 17.03 −500.69 100.19
Capital expenditures ratio (%) 7.90 6.44 5.76 0.00 58.40
Leverage ratio (%) 25.79 24.34 24.44 0.00 966.61
Sales growth (%) 13.50 8.51 27.08 −40.80 225.50
Firm Level Governance Structure
Governance index 9.26 9.00 2.78 2 16
Insider ownership (%) 4.38 0.86 8.72 0.00 82.47
CEO Compensation
CEO cash compensation (millions, CPI-adjusted) 0.96 0.74 0.86 0.00 15.71
CEO options (% of total compensation) 29.99 25.99 27.78 0.00 100
Industry Characteristics
Ln(industrial concentration) 8.00 8.12 0.87 5.29 9.21
Stock Return Data (%)
Pre-M&A
CAR benchmarked, July t – June t+1 0.99 −0.78 41.48 −224.20 774.26
CAR 3-factor, July t – June t+1 2.64 1.21 41.53 −76.71 105.31
Buy-and-hold return, July t – June t+1 1.60 −5.85 53.40 −125.66 958.21
M&A performance
Announcement abnormal return 0.22 0.21 5.42 −51.57 30.59
Long-term CAR, benchmarked 0.06 −0.11 10.03 −59.20 60.02
Long-term CAR, 3-factor 4.37 2.36 49.60 −134.82 162.00








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Table V: Performance of Low Q and “Buying-growth” Acquirers
This table reports the means and medians of short-term and long-term M&A performance
measures among subgroups of observations. Each year, ﬁrms with q ratios less than the sample
median are deﬁned to be low q ﬁrms. Cash richness is deﬁned as the ratio of non-current-debt
cash and cash equivalents to non-cash total assets. Each year, ﬁrms with above industry (by
4-digit SIC code) median cash richness are deﬁned to be cash rich ﬁrms, otherwise they are cash
poor ﬁrms. In the subsample of M&A observation for which target pre-M&A three-year sales
growth rates are available, deals with target sales growth rates above the median are deﬁned to be
“buying-growth,” otherwise “non-buying-growth.”
cash rich, low q cash poor, low q
# of obs 483 479
mean median mean median
Announcement abnormal return 0.29 0.18 0.68*** 0.46
Announcement value-weighted AR −0.04 0.05
Long-term CAR, benchmarked 0.54 0.01 0.64 0.25
Long-term CAR, 3-factor −0.28 −1.82 4.45** 2.90
Long-term BHAR −0.34 −5.54 0.67 −2.76
“buying-growth” M&A “non-buying-growth” M&A
# of obs 156 154
Announcement abnormal return −0.90** −0.27 −0.42 0.11
Announcement value-weighted AR −0.73 −1.14
Long-term CAR, benchmarked −1.30 −1.62 0.55 −0.03
Long-term CAR, 3-factor 3.62 6.41 10.05** 5.37
Long-term BHAR −4.04 −5.39 2.40 −6.37














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Table VII: “Buying-Growth” M&A
This table reports the marginal eﬀects from logistic regressions on the subsample with target sales growth rates
available. The robust standard errors were estimated using a Huber-White “sandwich estimator” and adjusted for
ﬁrm level clustering. Target sales growth rate is the three-year growth rate prior to takeover. The median growth
rate of the sample is used as the benchmark. Other controls included are the same as in Table IV.
Dependent variable — 1=target sales growth rate above median;




Investment companies [0.012]** [0.019]*
Others [0.012]*** [0.010]
other controls Yes Yes
year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes
industry ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes
Observations 269 269
Pseudo R-square 0.219 0.200






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10Table X: For The Referee — Comparison between M&A Firm-years and Non-M&A Firm-years
This table reports the mean values of variables for M&A ﬁrm-year observations and non-M&A ﬁrm-year observations.




Aggregate public pension ownership (%) 2.98 3.10 (0.030)
Aggregate investment co. ownership (%) 14.01 11.93 (0.000)
Aggregate insurance co. ownership (%) 5.57 4.82 (0.000)
Aggregate private pension ownership (%) 1.16 0.97 (0.000)
Aggregate bank ownership (%) 11.04 9.82 (0.000)
Aggregate indep. advisor ownership (%) 25.29 24.65 (0.023)
Largest public pension ownership 1.23 1.50 (0.000)
Largest investment co. ownership 5.91 5.42 (0.000)
Largest insurance co. ownership 2.66 2.47 (0.000)
Largest private pension ownership 1.01 1.03 (0.003)
largest bank ownership 3.28 3.34 (0.000)
Largest indep. advisor ownership 5.48 5.70 (0.003)
Governance index 9.49 9.16 (0.000)
Insider ownership (%) 3.44 4.79 (0.000)
Total assets (millions, CPI-adjusted) 3,698.11 2,695.93 (0.000)
Market capitalization (millions, CPI-adjusted) 6,903.50 3,587.34 (0.000)
Cash ﬂow ratio (%) 11.31 9.42 (0.000)
Q ratio 2.16 1.76 (0.000)
Leverage ratio (%) 24.72 26.26 (0.063)
Capital expenditures ratio (%) 7.27 8.17 (0.000)
Sales growth(%) 16.02 12.40 (0.000)
CAR, benchmarked (June, year t - July, year t+1) 5.77 −1.09 (0.000)
CAR, 3-factor (June, year t - July, year t+1) 7.17 0.67 (0.000)
BHAR (June, year t - July, year t+1) 8.08 −1.21 (0.000)















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Table XII: For The Referee — Predicting M&A Frequency in the Long-run
This table reports the percent changes in Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) and P-values from negative binomial
regressions. The dependent variable is the number of M&A years during the eight years of the sample (July 1993
- June 2001). The independent variables are for observations in year 1992. Negative binomial regression is used
because the goodness-of-ﬁt test indicates overdispersion of the Poisson model. IRR (e
coeﬃcient) represents the factor
change in the expected count for unit increase in the independent variable. Percent change in IRR = (IRR-1)*100.
Other controls include the governance index, leverage ratio, insider ownership, CEO cash compensation, Q ratio,
prior CAR, and industrial concentration. Their coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant.
Dependent var — # of M&A years during the period of study
Institutional Ownership Aggregate Top indiv. 5% block Concentration
PPF −1.68 −4.08* −22.71 −4.92*
(0.255) (0.059) (0.110) (0.060)
Investment Co. 0.09 −0.37 −6.78 −0.37
(0.908) (0.769) (0.446) (0.819)
Insurance Co. 2.46** 1.58 17.6 1.28
(0.010) (0.210) (0.203) (0.390)
Private Pension 2.32 2.28 19.21 2.11
(0.101) (0.147) (0.445) (0.228)
Banks 1.16** 0.11 −4.16 −0.23
(0.031) (0.891) (0.653) (0.834)
Indep. Advisor −0.10 0.99 4.37 1.05
(0.794) (0.398) (0.590) (0.658)
CEO options (% of 0.33** 0.31* 0.33** 0.31*
total compensation) (0.044) (0.061) (0.047) (0.055)
Prior M&A +ve 85.33*** 88.35*** 91.23*** 88.57***
announcement CAR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Prior M&A -ve 64.84*** 66.4*** 67.96*** 67.71***
announcement CAR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash ﬂow ratio 1.07* 1.14** 1.1* 1.16**
(0.064) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039)
Size 9.68** 11.95*** 11.92*** 11.63***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Capital expenditures ratio −2.73*** −2.72*** −2.79*** −2.73***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prior CAR, benchmarked 0.31** 0.29** 0.31** 0.28**
(0.022) (0.031) (0.017) (0.032)
Other controls Yes
# of Observations 566
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Overdispersion P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* signiﬁcant at 10 %; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
13Table XIII: For The Referee — Simultaneous Equations Analysis on PPF Impact
This table reports the coeﬃcients and standard errors from the simultaneous equations estimations. The linear
system assumes that both the PPF ownership variable and the M&A activity dummy variable are endogenous. The
control variables are the same as in Table III and Table IV. Their coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance are also similar to
those reported in Table III and Table IV.
Dependent Variables
system (1) system (2)
Aggregate PPF M&A Activity PPF concentration M&A Activity
Ownership (1=Yes) (normalized) (1=Yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Instrument for aggregate PPF 0.795***
(0.018)
Instrument for largest PPF 0.749***
(0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (3-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,686 6,686 6,686 6,686
R-squared 0.654 0.143 0.629 0.144
* signiﬁcant at 10 %; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
14Table XIV: For The Referee — Post-M&A Operating Performance
Panel A reports the median operating cash ﬂow return on market value of assets, median cashﬂow margin, and
median asset turnover rate for the M&A ﬁrms in years surrounding the M&A completion year. Panel B reports the
summary statistics on abnormal operating performance. The ﬁrst method looks at the changes of industry-adjusted
measures (operating cash ﬂow return, cash ﬂow margin on sales, and asset turnover rate). The second method is
regression-based, with standard errors reported in parentheses. The median value of ﬁrm-level industry-adjusted
operating performance from the three years after M&A are regressed on the median value from the three years prior
to M&A. The diﬀerence between post-M&A performance and the predicted performance measures the abnormal
performance.
Panel A
Operating cash ﬂow returns Cash ﬂow margin on sales Asset turnover ratio
Year relative Firm Industry-adj # of Firm Industry-adj # of Firm Industry-adj # of
to M&A median median obs median median obs median median obs
all M&A ﬁrm-years
-3 14.66% 2.72% 1,963 23.21% 6.71% 1,970 68.76(c/$) −3.86(c/$) 1,965
-2 14.61 2.83 1,991 23.81 7.24 1,995 65.08 −3.79 1,992
-1 14.83 3.13 2,002 24.76 8.02 2,005 62.92 −4.72 2,002
1 15.72 3.84 1,746 26.57 9.39 1,746 61.22 −4.66 1,749
2 16.07 3.99 1,404 26.14 9.24 1,404 60.94 −4.94 1,408
3 15.85 3.86 1,028 25.67 9.21 1,028 61.56 −5.76 1,031
public targets only
-3 13.86% 2.47% 295 25.06% 7.65% 296 58.36(c/$) −8.12(c/$) 297
-2 13.76 1.99 335 26.79 8.97 335 55.64 −5.13 338
-1 13.84 2.37 311 26.85 8.37 311 50.07 −7.74 315
1 13.71 2.73 276 29.32 13.95 279 46.47 −8.98 279
2 12.55 3.44 216 27.69 11.33 219 49.92 −9.72 219
3 12.75 3.91 145 27.91 10.65 147 51.75 −7.89 148
Panel B
Abnormal industry-adjusted post-M&A operating performance - method 1
all M&A ﬁrm-years public targets only
mean median # of obs mean median # of obs
IACFpost,i − IACFpre,i 1.53*** 0.64 1,741 1.94*** 0.88 322
IACFMpost,i − IACFMpre,i 5.38*** 2.01 1,743 16.41*** 3.59 321
IAATpost,i − IAATpre,i −1.00 0.06 1,743 −2.30 0.74 323
Abnormal industry-adjusted post-M&A operating performance - method 2
all M&A ﬁrm-years
IACFpost,i = 2.586*** + 0.767*** IACFpre,i R
2=0.41 N=1,741
(0.219) (0.022)
IACFMpost,i = 8.357*** + 0.714*** IACFMpre,i R
2=0.24 N=1,743
(0.775) (0.031)




IACFpost,i = 2.146*** + 0.949*** IACFpre,i R
2=0.52 N=322
(0.460) (0.051)
IACFMpost,i = 22.834*** + 0.007 IACFMpre,i R
2=0.00 N=321
(3.304) (0.037)
IAATpost,i = −2.468* + 0.857*** IAATpre,i R
2=0.74 N=323
(1.422) (0.029)
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
15